Responding to enquiries: service delivery through National Enquiry Point

Delivery – enquiry handling process

228. We considered the process by which enquiries are handled by COPFS, including where they are resolved by Enquiry Point or passed on to other teams within COPFS. There are some differences in how call and email enquiries are handled. We therefore deal with the processes for handling calls and emails separately below.

Call enquiries

229.Enquiry Point can be reached by dialling 0300 020 3000. This number is widely publicised by COPFS, including on its website. There may be a cost to calling Enquiry Point depending on whether the caller is using a landline or mobile phone and the details of their calling plan. Where there is a cost, it should be no more than calls to geographic numbers (beginning 01 or 02).

Prior to speaking to an operator

230.When phoning Enquiry Point, the caller first hears a recorded welcome. The recording thanks the caller for phoning, advises them calls are recorded for quality and training purposes, reminds them of Enquiry Point’s opening hours, and informs them offensive or abusive behaviour towards operators will not be tolerated. Alternate recordings are used when the lines are closed, when there are technical issues or when the call queue has reached capacity.

231.We consider there is scope to revise the recorded welcome. For example, consideration could be given to:

• using the recorded message to divert callers to other sources of information, such as the COPFS website
• suggesting that callers use email instead, if they are not able to wait in the queue until their call is answered
• revising how the message about offensive or abusive behaviour is presented. Currently, this message dominates the recorded welcome. Altering the tone and content of the message takes account of the need to take steps to safeguard operators from abuse, while also being mindful of the difficult circumstances in which many callers find themselves when contacting COPFS
• advising those calling about a case to have a case reference number ready if one is available.

232.Callers should also be advised of their place in the queue and/or the length of time they will wait before their call is answered. Currently this does not happen. It would, however, be beneficial in light of data about the average and maximum call queue times and feedback we heard from those who had called Enquiry Point. Sharing this information with callers would allow them to assess whether they want to wait in the queue, call back another time or send an email instead. Information could also be published about the days and times when the call queue is less busy.

233.Where callers are enquiring about a case, operators will routinely ask for the case reference number. This helps them easily identify the correct case and helps them deal with enquiries more quickly. The benefits of having the case reference number ready should not only be included in the recorded message, but should also be highlighted in any correspondence or other material publicising Enquiry Point’s contact information. The Enquiry Point page on the COPFS website could usefully be updated with this information.

234.Where information is needed about a case but the caller does not have the case reference number, operators require to conduct system searches to identify the correct case. The search function can be slow and temperamental, and there is a risk that the wrong case is found. In the past, operators tended to ask for the name of the accused person in the case, as they found this helped identify the correct case more easily, particularly if the person calling (often a victim or witness) was involved in more than one case.

235.In an effort to take a trauma-informed approach, operators have been instructed not to ask for the accused person’s name unless necessary. Where it is necessary, operators have been told to advise the caller that they need only disclose the accused’s name if they are comfortable doing so. While we welcome the desire to be trauma-informed, this instruction can result in protracted case searches and several other questions being asked of the caller in an effort to identify the correct case. There is also a risk of the wrong case being identified and incorrect information being given out. Operators may require to ask those calling for details of the accused, in order to provide a quick and accurate response, so long as they do so sensitively.

Recommendation 10
To ensure a more customer-focused and efficient enquiry handling service, COPFS should:

(a) review the information it publishes about contacting Enquiry Point so those making enquiries can choose the method and timing of contact that best meet their needs and have information to hand that will help their enquiry be dealt with more quickly

(b) review Enquiry Point’s recorded welcome message and provide information to callers about the expected wait or their position in the queue.

Verifying identity

236.Where a caller’s enquiry relates to a specific case, the operator will carry out an identity check before sharing any information. This is in accordance with data protection law. Generally, only those listed as a victim, witness or accused are entitled to information about a criminal case from COPFS.

237.In some circumstances, a caller may be entitled to receive information where they are not a victim, witness or accused but they are calling on their behalf. This includes, for example, a parent of a child witness or someone who has been given permission to act on a witness’s behalf (such as an advocacy worker or a friend). Operators verify that this permission has been given.

238.The identity of other types of caller also requires to be verified. For example, an operator will check that a letter of engagement is in the case file before providing information to a defence agent about their client’s case.

239.In the calls we audited, we noted whether identity checks were carried out. Of the 144 calls we audited, 14 were general in nature and did not require that the caller’s identity be verified. In the remaining 130 calls:

• in 119 (92%) calls, identity checks were carried out appropriately
• in six (5%) calls, identity checks were carried out but were inadequate
• in five (4%) calls, no identity checks were carried out.

240.In some of the calls we audited where identity checks were carried out, this resulted in the operator correctly refusing to give out information as the caller was unable to supply the necessary details.

241.We heard from some victim and witness advocacy workers that the identity checks carried out by Enquiry Point can be a barrier to them fulfilling their role. Despite working for well-known support organisations, if a victim or witness’s consent has not been intimated to COPFS for the advocacy worker to be given information about their case, operators will refuse to provide it. While this is in keeping with the law and policy, advocacy workers note that this approach is not taken by other teams within COPFS with whom they may have more established relationships. It can result in victims and witnesses having to contact Enquiry Point to provide consent or to make enquiries themselves, reducing some of the benefits of having an advocacy worker.

242.Protecting the data of those involved in cases is essential, however the important role played by advocacy workers also needs to be recognised. This is particularly so when there are efforts to increase the availability of domestic abuse advocacy workers across Scotland. We consider that COPFS should work with organisations employing advocacy workers to ensure that they are able to access information about their clients’ cases when contacting Enquiry Point. More generally, COPFS should ensure that staff outside of Enquiry Point who respond to enquiries also take data protection into account. We were concerned that the approach taken by other staff may not be as thorough as that taken by operators.

Recommendation 11
COPFS should ensure that:

(a) prior to giving out information to those making case-related enquiries, all staff carry out appropriate identity checks

(b) appropriate arrangements are in place that allow advocacy workers providing support to victims and witnesses to easily access relevant information on their behalf.

Verifying contact information

243.When we observed operators taking calls, we noted that some took the opportunity to verify a victim or witness’s contact details while they were on the phone. This good practice helps ensure COPFS has accurate and up-to-date contact information for any phone calls and correspondence, as well as ensuring that witnesses are cited at the correct address.

244.In our call audit, we noted that some operators checked whether the address and phone number of victims and witnesses calling Enquiry Point was up to date. Other operators did not. While verifying contact information adds slightly to the call length, it can save considerable time and effort at a later stage in case preparation and management, and can help ensure the smooth running of the justice process. This should become standard practice among operators.

Operator access to information

245.To resolve enquiries about specific cases, operators access various case management systems used by COPFS. The information requested by the caller may require to be pieced together by the operator from a range of fields or documents within the various systems. Operators also access information from SCTS’s Criminal Online Portal. This system is updated by court clerks with outcomes at court.

246.The need to use several systems to gather information is time consuming for operators. It results in the call being prolonged for the caller on the line, but also results in other callers waiting longer in the queue for their call to be answered. That the COPFS systems do not always work as efficiently as they should hampers operators’ productivity and affects their morale. It also risks incorrect information being given out when operators’ screens do not update as they should. We have noted the poor performance of COPFS’s case management systems in previous inspections and have highlighted that work on a new case management system be expedited. Our current review simply highlights another aspect of COPFS’s service delivery that is negatively affected by poor systems.

247.Some information requested by callers can be found in different systems. However, there appeared to be no consistency in how operators gathered the information from the systems, such as the order in which they should be checked and the reliance that should be placed on each. For example, the outcome of a court hearing can be found in the SCTS system once uploaded by the clerk, in the prosecutor’s court minute once it has been uploaded to the case file, or in the COPFS case management system once it has been updated. There were inconsistencies in which source was checked and uncertainty about the reliability of the information found in each. There was also inconsistency in whether unvalidated court outcomes could or should be shared.^[31] Some operators sought to verify the outcome by checking all sources, while others had received conflicting advice about what to do.

248.We observed that most operators were skilled at checking systems, but this was a complex task made more difficult by being carried out at speed and while a caller was waiting for a response. We were concerned that some operators did not always correctly interpret the information they found. For example, we observed an operator using the SCTS system to advise a caller that the accused had pled guilty to the charge. In fact, the accused had pled guilty to a lesser, amended charge. This highlights a training need for operators.

249.We also heard that operators find court minutes difficult to interpret. Court minutes are written by prosecutors at court and often contain their personal or local shorthand and acronyms. As a national contact centre, operators require to interpret the court minutes written by prosecutors across Scotland. We observed calls that could have been resolved by Enquiry Point at first point of contact, but were instead transferred to local offices because the court minutes were incomprehensible. This highlights a training need for both operators and local prosecutors.

Recording contact

250.After a call has concluded, operators have two minutes to ‘wrap up’. During this time, they should make a record of the call on the witness contact record (for victims and witnesses) or the subject record (for accused) on the case management system. They should also complete any other follow up work, such as sending an email to another COPFS team. If more than two minutes is required, operators can put themselves into ‘admin’ time on the system. While in ‘wrap up’ or ‘admin’ time, operators are not presented with a new call until their work on the previous call is complete.

251.In the witness contact or subject record, operators note the details of the enquiry including any information supplied and how it was resolved. The records can be viewed by operators if they receive a subsequent enquiry from the person or about the same issue. They can also be accessed by all COPFS staff. The information recorded by operators can often be key to supporting effective case management and communication with victims and witnesses. However, there are two ways in which systems do not support operators with recording their enquiries.

252.Firstly, there is a character limit on the witness contact and subject records, meaning operators are not always able to write as complete a note of the enquiry as they would like. This causes them to use shorthand and abbreviations. These may be familiar to those working in Enquiry Point, but may be challenging for other COPFS staff to interpret.

253.Secondly, systems do not support the recording of all types of enquiry. While there are designated fields for enquiries from victims, witnesses and accused to be recorded, there are no such fields for other types of enquiries. This includes enquiries from the police or defence agents. This means these enquiries are generally not recorded by Enquiry Point. Operators may send an email about the enquiry to the relevant COPFS team, and this may or may not be uploaded to the case file.

254.Where a case has been closed on the system, it is not possible to add any further information to it. If a victim, witness or accused subsequently contacts Enquiry Point, no record of the contact can be added to the case file. Similarly, if access to a case has been restricted due to its sensitive nature, operators cannot add information to it.

255.To address these system deficiencies, Enquiry Point has set up a workaround – a Microsoft Teams channel where it can enter details of enquiries about closed or sensitive cases, as well as other types of information. This means a record can be made and brings the enquiries to the attention of Enquiry Point colleagues. The channel is searchable. However, the channel is not accessible to staff outside Enquiry Point, and is not suitable as a permanent record keeping solution. It contains information that would be useful and, in some cases, essential for COPFS staff to be aware of, such as further contact from a victim or witness after a case is closed which should be considered for disclosure.

256.Of the 144 calls we audited, it was possible and appropriate for operators to have recorded the enquiries on the witness contact or subject records in 115. The enquiry was recorded in 101 (88%) of these. In the remaining 14 (12%), there was no record of the enquiry when there should have been.

257.Of the remaining 29 calls, there were 15 in which there was no need to record the contact (for example, calls from those seeking general advice). In 14, it would have been appropriate to record the enquiry on case management systems but it was not possible to do so. This included 13 calls about closed cases and one call about a sensitive case. Only one of these 14 calls was recorded on the Teams channel.

258.During our inspection, two other issues arose regarding the recording of enquiries. The first is the risk that operators are not always aware of how valuable some of the information they record is for the management and prosecution of cases. There may be information that should be brought to the attention of a prosecutor rather than simply filed on the system. While operators will sometimes send an email to the relevant COPFS team bringing their attention to the information recorded on the witness contact or subject record, this is not always done.

259.Secondly, the information recorded by operators is not always reviewed by those in other teams who are managing the case. We raised this issue in our inspection of the prosecution of domestic abuse cases at sheriff summary level. We noted that COPFS staff were often unaware that Enquiry Point recorded enquiries from victims and witnesses in the witness contact record. Even if they were aware this information was being recorded, they did not routinely review it or assess its implications for case management or victim and witness support. We recommended that:

‘COPFS should ensure that all victim and witness contact is recorded in one centralised place accessible to all staff. In the short term, COPFS should take immediate action to ensure that all staff are aware where victim and witness contact with Enquiry Point is recorded, and that staff use this information when preparing and managing cases.’^[32]

260.This recommendation was published in April 2024, but we had previously brought the issue to the attention of COPFS in late 2023. We were therefore disappointed that when we interviewed a range of staff across COPFS in late summer 2024 regarding how they responded to enquiries, a good proportion were still unaware of the existence of the witness contact record and the significance of the information therein. This included staff who had worked for COPFS for decades as well as those more recently employed. Staff working for certain teams were aware of it and used the records routinely.

261.In October 2024, COPFS highlighted our recommendation and the use of the witness contact record by Enquiry Point on its intranet in a message to all staff. While we welcome this message, further action should be taken to ensure staff check and use the information on the witness contact record routinely.

262.Regarding the broader point in our recommendation, that all contact with victims and witnesses is recorded in one place easily accessible to all staff, we consider that this is an essential step in ensuring staff are equipped with the right tools to do their job efficiently and effectively. We understand work is ongoing within COPFS to make the information in the witness contact and subject records more accessible to staff, such as by extracting the data for consideration before a case calls in court. We welcome efforts to address these issues in the short term, but note that some of the systems issues identified above may only be addressed by new case management systems in the longer term. In designing new systems, COPFS should ensure that issues such as those highlighted above are taken into account.

Recommendation 12
COPFS should ensure that Enquiry Point has appropriate systems and processes in place that support the recording of all types of enquiry and that this information is accessible to all those who may require it.

Transferring call enquiries

263.Enquiry Point operators try to resolve enquiries at the first point of contact. However, this is not always possible. For example, the caller may require information or assistance that can only be provided by a prosecutor, VIA or by one of COPFS’s specialist teams. In such cases, operators will try to transfer the caller to the relevant person or team.

264.The transfer of callers by operators to other teams within COPFS is one of the most significant challenges faced by Enquiry Point. Below, we set out the transfer process, the difficulties encountered by operators when trying to transfer callers and the impact this has on service users and staff. We then explore the reasons for those difficulties from the perspective of other teams within COPFS.

The transfer process

265.To transfer callers, operators make use of the Enquiry Point Directory. This contains contact details for all other teams in COPFS. Operators will try to contact an individual within the team or a ‘hunt group’. The hunt group will be made up of all or some team members. When the operator calls the hunt group, it will consecutively call all members of the group until someone answers. Some hunt groups work by calling all members simultaneously, and the first person who answers takes the call. However, we heard that COPFS generally uses the first type of hunt group. Hunt groups vary in size, but we heard about one which had 15 people.

266.Operators put callers on hold while they try to transfer them. When the transferred call is answered, operators advise their colleague who is calling and why. In our call audit, 27 transferred calls were answered by another COPFS team. In all but one, the Enquiry Point operator provided full and accurate information to their colleague about the enquiry during the handover. This minimised the need for the caller to repeat themselves once transferred.

267.If the other COPFS team was willing to accept the transferred call, most operators passed the call through. They did this without returning to the caller and explaining what was about to happen or to whom they were being transferred. The caller might only be transferred after several minutes on hold, while the operator searched systems to see if they could resolve the enquiry themselves, checked the directory for who might assist with the enquiry, dialled the relevant person and waited for them to answer. Good practice would be the operator speaking to the caller again before transferring them. Operators said they did not do this because they lacked confidence that their systems would not cut off the caller or the other COPFS staff member while doing so. One operator said they always advised the caller that either they will come back to them or they will connect them with someone else, at least warning callers that the next voice they hear may be a different one.

268.Where operators are not able to successfully transfer the calls, they provide an email address to the caller who can then email the relevant unit directly, or the operators themselves email the relevant unit to request they contact the caller. In our audit, operators told 28 callers they would send emails to another COPFS unit. In three cases, we could find no evidence of the email being sent. In 12 cases, an email was sent and was uploaded by the recipient to the case file. In 13 cases, an email was sent but there was no trace of the email in the case file.

269.There is no expectation within Enquiry Point that operators upload their emails to the case file. It is expected the recipients will do so. However, our findings suggest that this expectation is either not shared across COPFS, or is not being put into practice routinely. As a result, important information is not being added to case files and is not available to those who require it. COPFS should clarify who is responsible for ensuring emails from Enquiry Point are uploaded to case files and ensure this is done in practice.

Transfer difficulties

270.As noted, the transfer of callers by operators to other teams within COPFS is one of the most significant challenges faced by Enquiry Point. Transferring difficulties have existed since the inception of Enquiry Point. They have been highlighted in previous reviews, including in our own inspection in 2013 and the externally commissioned 2015 review of Enquiry Point. Despite this, the difficulties persist. While some steps have been taken to address the difficulties, their root causes also need to be identified and addressed.

271.The key issue is that operators make many attempts to transfer callers that do not succeed. Either the transfer does not succeed at all and operators require to take other steps to deal with the enquiry, or there are multiple attempts to transfer before transfer is eventually achieved.

272.Operators describe:

• attempting to contact colleagues across COPFS and their calls not being answered, even when the person they are trying to contact is showing as available online
• having to make multiple calls to different people within a team due to lack of response
• calling hunt groups of up to 15 people and no one answering their call
• significant delays in calls to hunt groups being answered
• some teams or individuals being well known for never answering calls.

273.Even when their calls to colleagues are answered, operators describe colleagues:

• refusing to accept the transferred call, or being clearly reluctant to accept the call
• being rude to operators
• implying that operators are interrupting them and preventing them from getting on with their job
• saying they cannot help because they are working from home.

274.Some staff will answer Enquiry Point’s call and look to provide the operator with the information to pass on to the caller, rather than just accepting the transferred call and providing the information directly to the caller. This may require the operator to wait while systems are searched. It shows no awareness that the operator has the caller on hold, that the operator has a queue of other callers waiting, or that the caller may have a follow up question which the operator is not in a position to answer. We heard that operators have been instructed to insist that other COPFS staff accept the transfer of the call, rather than keeping the operator on the line. All COPFS staff should be instructed to approach transferred calls this way, not just operators.

In one call we audited, the operator attempted to transfer the caller to a local VIA team. The VIA officer did not accept the transfer but did try to find the answer to the caller’s query while the operator and caller were on hold for almost 15 minutes. The VIA officer failed to find the answer and asked the operator to tell the caller that special measures ‘should have been’ granted for a trial the next day although this could not be confirmed.

275.What operators told us was confirmed when we observed operators dealing with enquiries and in our own call audit. It is also borne out by data gathered by Enquiry Point in early 2022 which showed a 17% success rate in transferring calls to other COPFS teams, rising to only 18% for transfers to VIA. VIA’s primary role is communicating with victims and witnesses.

276.In our call audit, operators tried to contact another COPFS team in 40 of the 144 calls. In three quarters of these calls, operators had to make more than one attempt to contact the other team. In a third of these calls, there was no answer.

In one call we observed, a member of staff working in a local office refused to accept an urgent call from a witness who could not attend court that morning. The staff member said they were working from home and had no access to the prosecutor at court who needed the information.

277.We also observed a lack of professionalism when some staff across COPFS answered calls from operators. COPFS staff are not aware that it is an operator calling, as the number displayed is that of the original caller, not Enquiry Point. Given that the call could be coming directly from a member of the public, it should be answered in a professional manner (ideally stating their name, team and asking how they can help). We heard calls being answered ‘what?’ and other inappropriate greetings. This is not in keeping with COPFS’s commitments to customer service.

278.There should also be a clear process or mechanism by which Enquiry Point can raise concerns about particular individuals or teams, and have those concerns acted upon. Where Enquiry Point managers have sought to do so in the past, they have sometimes had their concerns dismissed by local team managers. During our inspection, we heard that Enquiry Point had been asked to monitor and share information about which teams do not take calls. To have any value, this information must be acted upon by local managers.

279.Despite the widespread difficulties operators experienced when trying to transfer calls, they were also keen to mention that some individuals and some teams are more than willing to accept calls. This included teams that had a strong sense of ownership of their cases and therefore were keen to deal with any emerging issues, or teams that recognised they had specialist expertise unavailable to Enquiry Point. A consequence of some individuals being more willing to accept calls is that they tend to receive more calls, as operators know they are likely to answer.

In one call we observed, a vulnerable witness was unsure why she had been cited to give evidence. She waited 18 minutes in the queue before her call was answered by Enquiry Point. She waited 14 minutes on hold while the operator tried to transfer her to the relevant VIA team to arrange for her to view her statement. VIA did not answer the operator’s call. The operator sent an email to VIA asking them to call the witness. The caller advised she had already emailed COPFS several times with no response.

280.The difficulties experienced by operators in transferring calls affects callers, the service and individual staff. Transfer difficulties:

• prolong the call for the individual caller
• prolong the time spent by operators on calls, thereby extend the waiting time for all other callers in the queue
• hamper the productivity of operators and Enquiry Point as a whole
• can result in enquiries not being resolved that day or at all
• can result in urgent information not reaching local offices timeously
• cause operators to send emails to other COPFS teams, meaning the demand just shifts to another channel
• contributes to failure demand, when callers whose enquiry is not dealt with call or email again
• affects the morale and job satisfaction of operators
• may have a chilling effect on operators whereby they do not attempt to transfer calls when this is the most appropriate action, as they anticipate the transfer not being successful.

281.Ultimately, transfer difficulties affect the overall quality of and public confidence in the service delivered by COPFS.

282.These issues have been recognised by Enquiry Point and by senior leaders. Efforts have been made to address them. These include:

• messages from senior leaders to all staff about the transfer difficulties faced by operators and the standards of behaviour expected of staff across COPFS who play a role in responding to enquiries. Staff were reminded that calls are recorded and that a failure to deliver the expected standard of work would result in managers being informed and action being taken
• two pilot initiatives – the Secondary Response Team pilot and the Dundee pilot (paragraph 296).

283.Operators appreciate the recent attention being given to their transfer difficulties and the messages issued to staff. They feel the messages have an immediate impact that then subsides as time passes. We consider that more effort could be made to understand and address the underlying causes of the transfer difficulties.

284.During our interviews with staff working across COPFS, we sought to understand why they might be unwilling to unable to answer calls from Enquiry Point, or to accept transferred calls. We heard that:

• staff lacked capacity to deal with enquiries as well as their other work, citing a lack of resources in local office teams and pressure to get through other tasks
• some staff do not consider that dealing with enquiries is part of their work, hence their refusal to answer or accept calls
• staff, particularly new or inexperienced staff, lacked confidence in dealing with enquiries from the public
• some staff working in non-legal roles lacked knowledge about the justice process and institutional knowledge of COPFS and therefore felt ill-equipped to deal with questions
• many staff say they have not had training in dealing with the public and customer service, particularly in managing difficult or sensitive conversations (and an assumption from some staff that if Enquiry Point has not been able to deal with the call, then it must be difficult)
• working from home means staff are not learning from colleagues how to deal with enquiries or interact with the public
• staff might show as available online, but are actually mid-task and do not want to stop what they are doing and potentially lose their work by having to search systems to deal with an enquiry.

285.Underpinning all of the above, we heard about:

• a lack of effective supervision and management that allows unacceptable behaviour to go unchallenged
• poor systems, that hamper staff productivity and their ability to find the information they need or multi-task.

286.Some staff admitted they might be reluctant to answer calls from Enquiry Point as they felt enquiries were sometimes passed to them that operators could have dealt with themselves. They felt operators were just seeking reassurance that their proposed response to the enquiry was correct. This may indicate a training need for operators. In some cases, it could also reflect a lack of awareness about the breadth of the knowledge needed by operators and the fact that those working in local offices should have a greater depth of knowledge that operators may require to draw on. Most staff we interviewed felt that calls received from operators were transferred appropriately.

287.Some staff acknowledged they may give operators the impression that they are reluctant to take calls when they first answer, because they are shutting down the case they are currently working on or changing systems to allow them to deal with the enquiry. They felt this could be misinterpreted by operators as reluctance. They felt if operators had more awareness of other roles within COPFS, they would better understand what they are doing. This highlights the benefits of reciprocal shadowing (see paragraph 213).

288.The key themes that arose from our discussions with staff are training, attitudes, resources, management and systems. It is these issues that require to be understood and addressed by COPFS if transfer difficulties are to be resolved and customer service improved. There is some work already underway in COPFS that should assist – for example, the Designed for Success programme has identified staff oversight and line management as an issue and intends that it will be addressed.

289.We do not expect operators to be able to transfer calls on every occasion. There will be times when a member of staff is dealing with another pressing issue or is away from their desk (supporting a witness who has visited the office for example), but we believe the pattern of successful versus unsuccessful transfers can be reversed.

Recommendation 13
COPFS should work to understand and address the reasons that staff across the organisation are unwilling or unable to answer calls from Enquiry Point.

Enquiry Point and VIA

290.The difficulties operators experience when transferring enquiries appeared to be particularly prevalent when trying to contact VIA. Operators told us that many of the callers they seek to transfer to VIA are individuals who have a direct contact number for the VIA team or officer dealing with their case, but that the number is never answered when they call. They resort to calling Enquiry Point instead. Similarly, operators’ calls to VIA are often not answered.

291.Operators’ difficulties contacting VIA may be because the issues listed at paragraph 284 are particularly acute for VIA. There is also a lack of shared understanding of their respective roles, which may be contributing to a strained relationship between them.

292.Among operators and VIA staff we interviewed, inconsistent views were expressed about what information could and should be provided to victims and witnesses by VIA, and what could be provided by Enquiry Point. Operators felt that they can provide information to vulnerable witnesses, but that VIA should be able to provide more support and signposting, particularly if a witness is distressed. Operators presumed that VIA staff had more training to help them deal with such situations. Some VIA staff did not necessarily agree that this was their role. They felt operators transferred calls that Enquiry Point should deal with itself. Other VIA staff felt that they are better placed to deal with calls from vulnerable victims and witnesses.

293.This raises a concern we have previously expressed, that there is not collective understanding of the role of VIA, even among VIA staff.^[33] Why have staff dedicated to communicating with and supporting victims and witnesses, if that is not what they have the time and the skills to do daily?

294.Recent changes to the template letters to victims and witnesses used by VIA mean that the contact details for individual VIA officers or local VIA teams are now included. This is positive. It should encourage victims and witnesses to make direct contact with VIA, rather than through Enquiry Point. This should reduce demand on Enquiry Point, but only if:

• VIA staff are willing and able to answer their phones
• the barriers to them doing so are addressed by COPFS
• COPFS clarifies the proper role of Enquiry Point versus VIA
• VIA contact information is prominent in letters.

295.We understand that consideration is being given to embedding VIA resource within Enquiry Point to help manage enquiries. While we understand the drivers for this, we would urge caution regarding whether this is the appropriate solution. It risks drawing much-needed resource away from VIA teams. It also risks diminishing the benefits that designated VIA officers and teams are supposed to bring – that they are familiar with the victims and witnesses in their cases and therefore better able to offer appropriate support and signposting; and that they have connections with local prosecutors whose input may be needed.

Initiatives to address transfer difficulties

296.COPFS has explored two new initiatives to address Enquiry Point’s transfer difficulties. These are known as the Secondary Response Team pilot and the Dundee pilot.

297.The Secondary Response Team pilot is an Enquiry Point initiative designed to help operators who are struggling to transfer an urgent enquiry. Urgent enquiries include, for example, witnesses seeking an excusal on the day they are due to give evidence. Operators pass the enquiries to the Secondary Response Team who continue with efforts to contact the local COPFS office. This may include further calls, emails, direct messages and escalating enquiries to local managers. The operator who originally dealt with the enquiry is freed up to take new calls.

298.The pilot took place in the latter stages of our inspection and initially ran for a two-week period. During that time, 33 enquiries were referred to the Secondary Response Team. Of these, 26 were fully resolved within 93 minutes of the initial call. The remaining seven calls were escalated to managers and were resolved within three to four hours on average. Enquiry Point considers the pilot to have been a success and has sought to extend it for a further period.

299.We welcome Enquiry Point’s commitment to innovation and to improving its service. However, we caution against setting up new teams which simply draw resource from other already stretched resources. In this case, the Secondary Response Team comprised two experienced operators. Efforts to improve the service may be better focused on embedding better practice in existing structures. Nonetheless, we appreciate that the Secondary Response Team is a pilot and that further testing will help explore whether it is the most helpful solution to the transfer difficulties faced by Enquiry Point.

300.As well as seeking to address transfer difficulties, the Dundee pilot reflects COPFS’s commitment in its Business Plan 2024-25 to respond to all calls or messages to Enquiry Point via initial contact or by returned call in four hours.

301.The Dundee pilot involved one hunt group being established for all summary and sheriff and jury matters in Dundee. Only six staff were initially allocated to the hunt group, three each from the summary and sheriff and jury teams (the group had reduced to five at the time of our inspection). The idea was that Enquiry Point operators would only have to phone one number in Dundee, and the members of the hunt group were allocated clear responsibility for answering the phone. When the hunt group was called, all members’ phones rang simultaneously rather than consecutively to speed up the call being answered. If the call was not answered, operators would leave a voicemail or send an email to the office which would be picked up promptly and actioned.

302.Dundee staff would seek to resolve a call immediately or, if further work was required or the enquiry came via voicemail or email, to resolve the enquiry within four hours. Where it was not possible to resolve within the target timeframe, Dundee staff would advise the caller of the expected response time.

303.COPFS monitored the impact of the pilot. Prior to the pilot, Dundee staff were answering around a third of calls from Enquiry Point, but during the pilot, this increased to between 70 and 75%. In addition, we heard that the relationship between Enquiry Point and Dundee staff improved, with operators dealing with the same staff regularly. Where Dundee staff responded to an enquiry, 70% of enquiries had some form of response within four hours while 38% had a final response within four hours.

304.The pilot was not without challenges. COPFS’s systems did not easily support the monitoring of the impact of the pilot – data required to be manually extracted. This was time-intensive and meant the data was not as reliable as it could have been.

305.We also heard that despite designated staff being assigned responsibility for answering calls, some staff still appeared reluctant to take calls. The burden of answering calls fell unevenly across the Dundee staff, and operators said one member of staff in particular was the most likely to answer.

306.Dundee staff we interviewed also felt that there should have been two hunt groups rather than one. Summary staff in the group felt unable to immediately resolve queries about sheriff and jury matters. They often had to ask their colleagues for assistance before getting back to the caller. They suggested separate hunt groups for summary and sheriff and jury matters would help them resolve enquiries more promptly.

307.Staff were positive about having the responsibility to answer calls, but also suggested that those in the hunt group be rotated, perhaps every six months. This would ensure that other staff in the Dundee office took their turn at answering enquiries and did not become de-skilled.

308.Staff also noted that the four-hour response target was challenging for enquiries that required them to seek assistance from other members of staff, including prosecutors who might be unavailable for several hours due to being in court.

309.Despite the success of the pilot and the useful suggestions from staff on how it could be improved further, there appeared to be no clear vision for its future. There was no indication that it would be rolled out across COPFS. We heard other options were being considered, although these had not yet been fully developed at the time of our inspection. It was unfortunate that the suggestions from Dundee staff on how the pilot could be improved had not already been implemented. While we welcomed COPFS setting a four-hour standard for responding to enquiries, this could be applied in a more nuanced way, acknowledging that this will be impossible to achieve for some enquiries.

310.It is worth noting that the basic premise of the pilot, which commenced in 2023, was mooted in the 2015 external review of Enquiry Point but does not appear to have been taken forward at that time.

311.We have already noted that variations in how local offices should be contacted present challenges to operators. If other teams were more consistent in the contact information they provide to Enquiry Point – such as one hunt group for summary cases and one for sheriff and jury cases in each local office – the process may work more efficiently. This would require the members of the hunt groups to be clear that responding to enquiries is a key part of their role. Those staff should be supported – with the necessary time and training – to carry out this role, but should also be held to account for it. Contact sheets could feature clear escalation routes for each office, so that operators struggling to transfer an urgent enquiry always have a means by which to have it dealt with locally. We consider the ideas put into practice in the Dundee pilot and the suggestions made by staff for further improving that pilot are worth exploring further (see Recommendation 7).

Email enquiries

312.As noted above, enquiries from professionals and partner organisations make up a greater proportion of email enquiries compared to phone enquiries. In our audit, 48% of email enquiries were from professionals and partner organisations, compared to only 7% of phone enquiries.

313.All emails to Enquiry Point arrive in a single mailbox and are then triaged by an operator. Checks are made throughout the day for urgent emails (such as those relating to attendance at court that day). Emails from the public remain in the mailbox until they are actioned, while emails from certain groups are moved to separate folders. This includes:

• enquiries from solicitors requesting information about their clients’ pending or existing prosecutions (known as ‘agent case checks’)
• enquiries from the police regarding the criminal history of accused persons
• enquiries from the Scottish Prison Service regarding cases and seeking information to inform parole decisions.

314.Each day, operators are assigned to work through the mailbox and the folders to provide responses. Aside from urgent emails, emails are dealt with in the order they arrive. When dealing with email enquiries, operators will either respond to the enquiry or forward it to another COPFS team to respond.

315.Where emails are urgent, we noted that operators simply mark them as urgent and forward them to the relevant COPFS office to respond. There is a risk that these emails are lost in the large number of emails received by local offices and are not actioned immediately. COPFS should consider how best to mitigate this risk. For example, Enquiry Point could be more proactive in ensuring the urgent emails are dealt with (such as by phoning local office to advise of the email) and/or local offices should have processes in place to identify and action urgent enquiries. Alternatively, urgent emails could be allocated to the Secondary Response Team, if that pilot initiative is to be extended further.

316.Within Enquiry Point, email enquiries are generally managed by operators who are already experienced at call handling. We heard this was due to the risk of inexperienced operators providing incorrect information in writing to the enquirer. There did not seem to be the same fear of inexperienced operators providing incorrect information verbally while on the phone. We consider that those making enquiries should receive the same standard of service whether the enquiry is made by phone or email. While the reputational risk to COPFS of inaccurate written information may be perceived to be greater, from a user perspective, the outcome is the same.

317.We consider that responding to emails may provide new operators with a useful development opportunity, learning to manage enquiries without the time pressure of a caller waiting on the phone for a response. It also allows for draft responses to be overseen or spot checked by a supervisor before sending. Allowing new operators to consolidate their skills by responding to emails may assist in building their confidence.

318.While only experienced operators responded to emails, we felt that, generally, Enquiry Point prioritised calls compared to emails. This prioritisation may be caused in part by a greater proportion of calls coming from members of the public, while many emails are from partner organisations. It may also be a legacy of a time when Enquiry Point only dealt with calls. A difference in attitude between emails and calls was evident in our discussions with staff. We heard that operators allocated to the mailbox could be reassigned to answer calls when demand was high. It was also evidenced from our email audit – we found that operators simply forwarded some email enquiries to other COPFS teams to manage, when if that enquiry had been made by phone, they would have resolved it themselves. Response times to emails are also longer – only 9% of the emails we audited received a same day response.

319.Enquiry Point should carefully consider this prioritisation. The urgency of some email enquiries is equivalent to that of phone enquiries, and some members of the public only use email because calling is not an option for them. They may be unable to call Enquiry Point during its opening hours due to their own work schedule. They may also resort to email because they are unable to access the call queue or wait on hold for protracted periods of time. For some, email is simply a more accessible form of communication. They should not be disadvantaged because of their needs or preferences. Enquiry Point should be looking to provide comparable levels of service, regardless of whether an enquiry is made by phone or email (whether they choose to prioritise enquiries from members of the public over partner organisations is a different matter). Given average response times to emails, this may require a review of the resources allocated to and within Enquiry Point.

Verifying identity

320.As with call enquiries, operators verify the identity of the person sending an email enquiry and check that they are entitled to receive the information requested. Often, those emailing do not supply all the information needed to help an operator check their identity. The operator’s initial response to the email is therefore to request the information, rather than answer the enquiry. This is an essential step in the process, but delays the substantive response.

321.This process can be further complicated by Enquiry Point’s email management system. Emails are not, for example, allocated a unique reference number, allowing the enquiry to be tracked. When the enquirer responds to the identify check, their response goes to the general mailbox, not the operator who requested the information. Thus, when an enquirer responds to an identity check but does not include the original enquiry in the email, the operator monitoring the mailbox at that time (who may not be the same operator as carried out the identity check) requires to trace the original email in order to respond. This can delay the subsequent response.

322.During our inspection, we audited 56 email enquiries. As with the calls we audited, we assessed whether identity checks were carried out appropriately. Because many of the enquiries came from partner organisations such as Police Scotland, there was no need to carry out identity checks. For the remainder, identity checks were mostly carried out appropriately by the operator where Enquiry Point itself resolved the enquiry. When we asked operators about how they verified the identity of the emailer, there was some inconsistency in their responses, and inconsistency in how they approached emails compared to calls. This should be addressed through operator guidance and training. In addition, where the operator forwarded the enquiry to another team, we were concerned there was a lack of clarity about whether the operator should carry out the identity check prior to forwarding, or whether the recipient office should carry out the check. This lack of clarity risked no checks being carried out.

323.To minimise the back and forth involved in identity checks, COPFS should publicise the information that those sending emails need to include to expedite the process. Consideration could also be given to including an online form on its website that supports the submission of enquiries and encourages individuals to specify the information needed for an identity check to be carried out. The form could also encourage inclusion of the case reference number where this is relevant to the enquiry.

Managing and recording enquiries

324.In our audit of 56 email enquiries, we could find no record of a response to two enquiries. Given the system for managing emails in Enquiry Point, we consider it more likely that the absence of a response was a record keeping issue rather than a failure to respond.

325.Enquiry Point has sought to organise its email enquiries as best it can, but the system itself is rudimentary. It is not of the standard expected in a contact centre environment and is not conducive to effective record keeping or retrieval of linked emails, or efficient email handling. There is also no integration between the systems for managing phone and email enquiries.

326.While emails from and to defence agents, police and other partner organisations are stored in designated folders, emails from members of the public, once actioned, are generally stored in a folder linked to the COPFS office or team dealing with their case. Responses to email enquiries are sent from the Enquiry Point email address but are found in individual operators’ sent items. Operators are required to move sent items to the same folder where the original email is stored, but do not always do so.

327.During our audit, as well as being unable to trace any response to two enquiries, we were unable to trace some responses in an email chain in the folders where they should have been stored. While some of these responses were eventually found in the personal mailboxes of operators, others were never found.

328.Enquiry Point operators do not upload case-related emails to the electronic case file. They expect that if the enquiry is forwarded to the COPFS team managing the case, it is that team’s role to update the case file. If the email enquiry is dealt with entirely by Enquiry Point, the only record of it is stored in the Enquiry Point mailbox. This is not accessible to staff across COPFS. There is a risk that information that may be potentially valuable to a prosecutor or other person managing a case is currently unknown and inaccessible to them. In our audit, 59% of email enquiries were dealt with entirely by Enquiry Point. As a result, no record of the enquiry would be found outside the Enquiry Point mailbox. Enquiry Point staff should be uploading these emails to the case management system.

329.An example of an email enquiry that is not recorded in the case file, but which may be useful to those managing the case is one from a defence agent indicating they are acting for the accused. The agent may, for example, be aware of the case from the accused, but is seeking its reference number from Enquiry Point. Operators may provide the information but take no further action. Those managing the case may be unaware of who is acting for the accused and an opportunity for early resolution may be missed.

330.While the Enquiry Point mailbox can be searched, the volume of stored emails make this challenging. At the time of our inspection, the folder containing emails from members of the public that had already been actioned had over 230,000 emails. It appeared that emails were stored indefinitely. It was unclear how COPFS’s records management policy was being applied to email enquiries.

331.Even where a case-related email enquiry is forwarded to the COPFS team managing the case, the initial enquiry and any response were not always uploaded to the case file. Again, this risks information not being known or accessible to those who require it. Of the emails we audited, 20 were forwarded by an operator to another COPFS team. Only half of these were uploaded to the case file. Uploading was always carried out by the other COPFS team. We also found that on no occasion did the Enquiry Point operator update the witness contact record with details of the email enquiry, as would have happened if the enquiry had been made by phone. Presumably, this was because they expected the enquiry itself to be added to the case file.

332.Staff have told us the process for uploading emails to case files can be cumbersome and time consuming. This may have contributed to the absence of email enquiries from case files. Where email enquiries were uploaded to case files, this tended to be done by VIA. The usual practice for VIA staff is to update VIA minute sheets with information about any contact with a victim or witness.^[34] This is where we tended to find a record of email enquiries.

333.The email system operated by Enquiry Point, coupled with inadequate record keeping across Enquiry Point and other teams in COPFS, mean information that may be relevant to the management of cases is not easily accessible to all those who may require it. This risk requires to be addressed. COPFS also requires to review its approach to records management within Enquiry Point.

Response

334.To achieve a comparable level of service in how it responds to calls and emails, Enquiry Point requires to revisit its approach to emails. Too often, we found operators were simply forwarding emails to other COPFS teams rather than seeking to resolve the query. This is in contrast to the goal for call enquiries, 80% of which Enquiry Point aspires to resolve at first point of contact.

335.In our audit, only 59% of emails were resolved by Enquiry Point. However, email enquiries from partner organisations were more likely to be resolved by Enquiry Point than enquiries from the public. Only 31% of email enquiries from members of the public were resolved by operators with a larger proportion being forwarded to other COPFS teams for a response.

336.Where operators did attempt to resolve email enquiries from members of the public, the results were mixed. We found some responses to be good, but others to be brief, unhelpful and one was inaccurate. We noted similar issues in the email responses to partner organisations. This was echoed by respondents to our survey. For example, police respondents felt operators did not always respond to the entirety of their enquiry, resulting in prolonged email exchanges. They felt more attention to detail was required.

‘As a unit we send many emails per day and having to frequently go back and forth trying to get a clear reply is very frustrating and time consuming… I am often responded to with exactly what I have written in my initial email which is obviously very unhelpful.’ (Police survey respondent)

337.Operators seemed less confident and less skilled in writing responses to enquiries than providing verbal responses. We also found individual operators took different approaches to responding to email enquiries. Their responses varied in tone, formality and length. Some provided very brief information while others tried to pre-empt follow-up questions. Practice varied even when emails were being forwarded to other COPFS teams for action. Some operators simply forwarded the email, others forwarded the email and copied in the person who made the enquiry, others forwarded the email and also responded to the person who made the enquiry to let them know they had done so. The inconsistencies in how email enquiries are managed highlights the need for guidance, training and clear processes to ensure those emailing Enquiry Point receive a comparable level of service to those who phone. While we understand Enquiry Point has begun to develop guidance for responding to particular categories of email, a more comprehensive review of guidance and instructions for staff is needed.

Recommendation 14
COPFS should review how Enquiry Point responds to emails, ensuring that those who make email enquiries receive a comparable level of service to those who make enquiries by phone.

Forwarded emails

338.When operators forward email enquiries to other COPFS teams for action, they do so using the Directory. As it does for calls, the Directory sets out myriad instructions on how other teams are to be contacted. Some offices operate general mailboxes, while others ask operators to forward enquiries to the individual mailboxes of staff (and often the mailboxes of multiple staff members). With so many varied instructions, there is scope for operators to forward emails to the wrong person or team. The frequency with which other teams check mailboxes varies.

339.Recent changes to letters sent by VIA in summary cases means victims and witnesses are being given the Enquiry Point rather than the local VIA email address. It was hoped Enquiry Point would deal with the emails it could and only forward those it could not, thereby relieving pressure on VIA staff. However, VIA staff we interviewed felt this new approach had simply introduced delay. They felt Enquiry Point was just forwarding the emails to them, but only after they had sat in the Enquiry Point mailbox for a few days. They also felt operators marked all emails to VIA as urgent even when they were not.

340.Operators felt that forwarded emails are often not actioned. They receive follow-up emails from the person who made the initial enquiry saying they have had no response (another example of failure demand). When following up on behalf of the enquirer, operators sometimes note an email has been uploaded to a case file, but not dealt with. In our audit, 20 email enquiries were forward to another COPFS team for action. We could find no evidence of any action being taken in response to six of those emails by the other team.

341.An enquiry ticketing system, as suggested at paragraph 384, may help COPFS better monitor enquiries to ensure they have received a response.